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The following comments on the first Indonesian Five-Year Developmerrb
Plan, and the proposals for further research, are based on the studies of
the M.I.T. Indonesia Project and those of the other projects in the Economic
and Political Development Program of the MI.To Center for International
Studies, Accoringy17, thi s paper does not. discuss "project planning" The
kind of knowledge w hich can be derived fro- the research carried out by the
M.I.T. Economic and Political Developmont Prograin does not permit evaluation
of individual projects within a development plan. It is our general impression
that the project planning underlying the Indonesian plan has been competently
done. That is to say, given the scale of the investment program and its
allocation among major sectors and regions, the selection of individual
projects within each sector and region appears to be well based,, However,
this impression is only a general one and does not reflect careful study of
individual projects, which could not be carried out by such a group.
Accordingly, our comments and proposals rilate to the more general aspects
of the plan, in particular to its scale, its sectoral allocation, its
regional allocation, its phasing, and its financing.
In commenting on the present draft of the plan framework, we have
naturally concentrated on those aspects of it that leave room for improve-
ment. We do not dwell on the many strong points of the plan. Nor do we
labor here the point that it was a great achievement for the Bureau to have
completed any plan whatsoever in the political and economic environment
*This memorandum is based n a discussion in the Senior Economic Seminar of
the M, I.To Center for Itentinal Studies It reflects the view-ts of all
members of the Seminar, but responsibility or the presentation rests with
the author aloner
2prevailing in Indonesia in the years 1952-1956. We have made that point
elsewhere, in our study of Indonesia's Economic Stablisation and De-
velopment (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957). In Chapter 2
of that study it is stated:
If the sole result of the Indonesian Government-United Nations
experiment in development planning had been to persuade
Indonesians with the ability and experience of the present
Director-Genera.l (Minister) and his Deputy to devote full time
to development planning, the experiment would have been well
worth while0 And the Agreement has done much more. It has
resulted ultimately in the establishment of a planning organi-
zation that is very well designed. It has introduced into the
process of government a degree of coordination that was pre-
viously unknown. It has made government officials much more
development-conscious and has helped to improve the administra-
tion of the capital budget and of foreign aid. It has made
economic development planning as such a topic for cabinet-
level discussion. Through press comments on its work the
Planning Bureau has aroused more widespread interest in
economic development among the literate public, It is pro-
viding training to a group of promising young Indonesians.
It has provided background information for Indonesian delega-
tions to Colombo Plan and ECAFE conferences, and useful advice
on current policy issues, Even more important, the plan pre-
sented to the Cabinet is an Indonesian plan, and not merely a
plan put together in relatively short order by a group of
foreign experts. The chances of its being accepted and executed
by the government are therefore much better than is the case with
plans which are only a set of recommendations from a group of
outsiders,
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3I. Scale of the Plan
The size of the investment budget in a development plan is the pro-
duct of three factors: the targets that are set with regard to the rise in
per capita income (or in employment); the estimated rate of population
groth; and estimates of the incremental-capital-output-ratio (ICOR) or of
the incremental-capital -jdo-ratio. We will discuss each of these in turn.
Targets
It is of course the responsibility of the government of an underdeve-
loped country to select its own target with respect to growth of per capta
income. The degree of ambitiousness in this respect necessarily reflects
political and administrative considerations as well as economic and technical
ones0 However, it is possible to state a few principles regarding targets
on the basis of general knowledge of the process of economic growth.
First, the target for increase in total output must be high enough to
assure that it will exceed the growth cf population and bring at least some
measurable and noticeale increase in pr capita income It follows that the
target for growth of output must exceed the estimated growth of population
by enough to offset probable errors in the estimates. Second, in a society
which has not experienced economic growth for generations, the target
increase in per cap ita income must be high enough to bring significant
changes in attitudes towards technological progress, propensity to save,
supply curves of labor and entrepreneurship, and the like, so as to launch
a cumulative process of technological improvement, rising productivity, and
rising standards of living0
It does not appear to us that the target set forth in the first Five-
Year Plan meet these requirements. The estimates of capital requirements
4for launching cumulative growth in Indonesia undertaken by the M.I.T.
Indonesia Project suggest that the capital requirements for a "take-off" in
Indonesia amount to some Rp. 12 billion to Rp. 15 billion per year. The
same conclusion seems to have been reached by the National Planning Bureau;
the plan is designed to achieve sustained growth only in the course of the
fourth five year period. The first Five-Year Plan calls for net investment
of only Rp. 6 billion per year, or 6 per cent of national income. This target
does not seem- high enough to meet either of the two principles set forth
above.
The plan speaks of the "sacrifice" of the current generation for
Indonesia's future. In fact, however, the Indonesian development plan
involves neither a sacrificial effort for one generation nor an early take-
off into steady growth. Only 40 per cent of the expected small increase in
e rcapita income (1.3 per cent) is to be recaptured for future investment,
and 60 per cent is to be made available for higher consuption. Thus no
"belt-tightening" is called for; on the other hand, an increase in pe
consumption of three-quarters of one per cent per year, starting
from the present low level, will not in itself generate enthusiasm for the
plan.
Perhaps the authors of the plan felt that in a society that has been
essentially stagnant for generations (if not actually declining) it does not
matter much whether cumulative growth starts now or in twenty years. However,
in the present plan the achievement of steady growth in twenty years depends
on the increase of investment from 6.8 per cent of national income in the
first Five-Year Plan to 8.5 per cent in the second Five-Year Plan, 12 per
cent in the third five years, 16 per cent in the next, and 20 per cent by
the end of the fourth Five-Year Plano These increases in investment are so
small that with existing imperfections of national income statistics it would
be very hard to tell whether year-by-year goals are being attained or not;
yet even these modest goals require a more rigorous fiscal policy--and thus
some enthusiasm for the plan. A stagnant ec onomy is like a stalled car;
leaning on it with gradually increasing we"ght is unlikely to get it started.
It needs "a big push",, The present plan will not change parameters enough
to bring new attitudes, new behavior pattLe: rns and the like0
Further delay in launching cumulativ'e growth should be avoided if at
all possible. The revolution injected a dynamic into Indonesian society,
and every effort should be made to direct this outburst of energy towards
economic growth. If too much time is allcwed to pass without a major deve-
lopmental effort this dynamic may be lost.
Moreover, the political situation is clearly unstable. To satisfy the
demands of dissident groups, and particularly those of the Outer Islands, it
seems likely that the government will be comapelled either to engender a
united effort "to win the economic revolution", or to provide noticeable
improvements in the standard of living in the near future. In point of fact,
considering the optimism with respect to IOR (see below), it is doubtful
whether the plan will do more than keep pace with population growth, The
present plan will not solve the Javanese employment problem, and it leaves
essentially untouched the growing discrepancies between p capita output in
Java and on the Outer Islands, which can only aggravate frictions between the
Center and the outlying regions. Also, some neighboring countries are doing
better than Indonesia relative to their incomes. Will Indonesians remain
content with a development plan that brings such meager results?
If the modesty of the plan represents a political judgement of what
is possible at this stage, it would be brash indeed for any outsider to
criticise it on these grounds. If it is base-d on the experience of such
6countries as India (the scale of the investment budget and the ICOR are the
same as in the first Indian Five-Year Plan), however, it represents a mis-
application of this experience. Indonesia starts from a much higher per
capita income and a much broader resource base than India, and can accordingly
start with a more ambitious program than was entailed in the first Indian
Five-Year Plano
It is our conclusion, therefore, that every effort should be made to
accelerate the n of developmental intestmento
The presentation of the investment lbudget contains an element of
ambiguity. The first Five-Year Plan calls for investment of 6 per cent of
national income, slightly above the estimated rate of net investment in
recent years. The Planning Bureau also says, however, that the rate should
have reached 8 1/2 per cent of national income by the end of that period,
Clearly, if investment is 6 per cent of national income in the first year of
the Five-Year Plan and 8 1/2 per cent in the fifth, total investment over the
period as a whole will be in excess of 6 per cent of the national income.
Similarly, for the second Five-Year Plan the rate is given as 8 1/2 per cent,
although it is estimated that the rate will have reached 10 per cent by the
end of that period0
Taking this concept as a basis, the Bureau might restate its targets
by assuming that the rate of net investment of 6 per cent of national income
is reached in 1958. They might be more cautious with respect to incremental-
capital-output-ratios, and assume that it will be 2.5 in the first Five-Year
Plan, 3.0 in the second Five-Year Plan, and 3.5 in the thirdo Finally, they
might assume that during the first five years the entire increase in national
income is recaptured, and devoted to development purposes0 In the second
lIn Ekonomi dan Kouangan Indonesia, November 1956.
7Five-Year Plan and the early years of the third, the increase in national
income can be divided between increased investment and an increasing standard
of living. After ten years 80 per cent of the rise in national income could
be allocated to increased consumption. We would then get a pattern of expan-
sion such as that shown in Table A below; "steady growth" is achieved in ten
years, with an annual increase in 2r capitA income and consumption of 3 per
cent or more from that time on. By shortening the transition from past
stagnation to sustained growth such a program would greatly improve the
chances of achieving a genuine "take-off".
Population Growth
The stimates with respect to population growth seem reasonable enough,
and it is a strong feature of the plan that it allows for some initial rise in
the rate of population growth, as a consequence of the present age-distribu-
tion, public health measures, and the possible positive impact on fertility
of a new wave of industrializvtion. However, the margin of error allowed in
the plan is so small that a population growth of 2 per cent in the first
five years (instead of the estimated 1.7) and an ICOR of 3 (instead of the
estimated 2) would mean that the present plan would bring no rise whatsoever
in per capita income, even if the plan were carried out completely in all
sectors, including the private investment and local government sectors. It
is therefore of obvious importance that demographic studies be undertaken
to determine more accurately the present and probable future rates of
population growth.
It must also be recognised that the result of further research may be
a conclusion that given the limitations on the scale of investment in the
near future, an active population policy, designed to reduce fertility at
8least enough to offset expected reductions in death rates, will be a
sine gua non for economic growth. The attachment to the team of foreign
experts in the Planning Bureau of population experts presumably reflected a
recognition of this possibility; but the plan includes no discussion of this
problem. The dramatic drop in birth rates in Japan, the initial results
of research in India, and the initial results of research in Indonesia under-
taken by the Institute of Economic and Social Research in Djakarta, suggest
that an active policy with regard to population can be effective. Even such
measures as keeping gils in schoo1 to the' ge of siXteen or seventeen might
influence birth rates significantly, Horeer, the subject is clearly one
that merits further study.
At one stage of the discussion of the development plan, it was thought
that an ambitious transmigration program might provide relief for population
pressure on Java. The discussion of transmigration in the present plan
indicates that this approach to the population problem has been abandoned.
It is our view that this course was the correct one; the whole experience
with organized resettlement, both in Indonesia and in other countries,
suggest that it is not a solution to the problem of finding productive
employment for the annual additions to the Javanese population. With
total cost of resettlement running at Rp. 10,000 to Rp. 15,ooo per family
resettling (say) three hundred thousand families a year, so as to absorb
the whole of the Javanese population growth, would require a budget of
Rp. 3.0 to Rp. 4.5 billion--considerably more than the total development
budget of the central government as proposed in the present plan.
'This figure was given by Dr. Sie and Dr. Pelzer. The official figures for
1953 and 1954 are lowero
9On the other hand, it should be recognized that the population pro.
blem is a Javanese one, and the use of a simple average population growth
for the entire country, together with a single ICOR for estimating capital
requirements, may result in a target that Is quite unrealistic when it is
considered that two-thirds of the population growth takes place on the one
small island of Javao The costsof absorbing the population growth into
productive employment are much higher than they would be if the population
were evenly spread throughout the country,, In arriving at over-all targets,
capital-job calculations as well as capital-output calculations should be
made. The present plan, however, includes no capital-job ratios,
The ICOR
Turning to the ICOR itself, it seems quite clear that the ICOR of
2:0 used as a basis for calculation in the first five years is too low,
especially in the light of the compositi on of the plan, which is rather
heavily weighted towards high ICOR projects (see Table B ). As was pointed
out in my article in Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, January 1957, there is
no record of ICORs this low except during reconstruction periods. Indonesia
suffered a good deal of destruction and disruption of economic life during
the war and revolution. The ICOR of 1.5:1 implicit in the Planning Bureau's
estimates of national income in the past fei years may be plausible, con-
sidering the amount of rehabilitation and reorganization required, and the
opportunities for capital-cheap increases in agricultural output through
introduction of fertilizer, seed selection, repair of irrigation systems,
replanting of abandoned land, and the like. It is also possible that in
Indonesia the "reconstruction period" in this sense should have lasted five
years after the transfer of sovereignty.
It would be risky to count on the "bargain-counter"phase lasting five
years more. Some opportunities for capital-cheap increases in output-such
as removing squatters from plantation lard--still exist,, The possibilities
of raising output of foodstuffs by increased use of fertilizer and better
seed are not altogether exhausted. But tne entire agricultural sector
accounts for ory 13 per cent of the central government's investment budget,
and only in this sector can an ICOR below 2:1 be expected. In calculating
an aggregate ICOR for the economy, it is the proportion of investment going
into capital-cheap projects that counts, not the proportion of total income
or employment in the labor-intensive sector. There is little conclusive
information on the ICOR in the welfare sector, but it is unlikely that
Rp. 1 million spent on public health or education will add (permanently)
more than Rp. 500,000 to the national income. The three sectors accounting
for three-quarters of the central governrent investment budget-transport
and comrunications, power and irrigation, and industrialization--can have
very high ICORs indeed, probably averaging above 4:1. Private investment
is also likely to be rather capital-intosive. The community development
sector can of course be capital-cheap, but it is only one quarter of the total
and may not bring much permanent increase in national income in a country
like Indonesia, where lack of access roads, irrigation systems, and the
other kinds of social capital that can be provided on a community self-
help basis are not the major bottlenecks. Given the sectoral allocation of
the investment budget it is hard to see how the ICOR could average as low
as 2:1.
If there were opportunities for substantial increases in Er capita
output in the peasant agriculture sector one might be more optinistic
bout the size of the aggregate ICOR, . I Indonesia, however, the possi-
bilities of capital-cheafp develIopment a l.imited by the special nature of
the problem of Javac Here on th-is one island are three-fifths of Indonesiaus
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80 million people, making Java the most densely populated sizable area in
the world. Fragmentation of holdings in peasant agriculture has gone
as far as it can go and still support fami lies at a subsistence level. The
increase in Javanese population of nearly one million persons per year must
be taken care of elsewhere in the economy,.
It is our understanding that the selection of this low ICOR was based
partly on Indian experience under the first Five-Year Plan. However as
Table B shows, evxen the second Indian i-Year Plan seems somewhat less
capital-intensive than the central government sector of the Indonesian
plan. Of course, the Indian plan incorporates the community development
program, which is perhaps the least capital-intensive of all, while the
figures given for Indonesia relate to the central government sector alone.
On the other hand, the private investment sector in Indonesia is likely to
have extremely high capital output ratios, if indeed the projected level
of private investment is achieved. For thie only way in which investment of
Rs. 10 billion (say, 65 billion) will occiur in the five years covered by
the first plan is through a large-scale inflow of foreign capital, which
would go into such highly capital-intensive projects as petroleum and
mining. Thus it is extremely unlikely that Indonesia will enjoy an ICOR
lower than that experienced under the second Indian plan; and the Indian
government has recently revised its estimated ICOR for the second Five-Year
Plan from 2.3 to 3.5, as a result of lessons learned during the first year
of that plan. If this figure were used for Indonesian instead of 2, the
present plan would bring no improvement in per capita income in the first
five years, even if executed in full and if the population growth does not
exceed the estimated 1.7 per cent per year.
Ultimately, of course, the use of IC> derived from experience of any
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other country is always somewhat dangerous, Here is another area in which
further research should be undertaken, It would be desirable to estimpte
ICORs both by sectors and by regions. Thie aggregate ICORs should then be
calculated according to the sectoral and regional distri.bution of the
investment budget 0 For example, there in some reason to suppose that the
ICOR may be lower in Java than in the Outer Islands, since the "infra-
structure" (or social capital) is more highly developed on Java than else-
where in the countryd Java is clearly better off than the Outer Islands
for railroads, and is somewhat better provided with shipping and airways. It
is probably better provided with roads as well. While some Javanese roads
have fellen into disrepair, their improvement would be less costly than
the construction of new roads in Sumatra and Kalimantan. However, this is
precisely the sort of question on which more detailed research needs to be
done.
Sectoral Distribution
An obvious weakness of the present plan is that only the investment of
the central government can be regarded as in any way assured. Nothing
approaching a "plan" now exists either for the community development sector
or for the private inrestment sector,
It is true, of course, that detailed targets with respect to investment
and output in these sectors can be rather meaningless. On the other hand,
if the projected investment in these sectors--nearly 60 per cent of the total--
is really to be carried out, a great deail more attention must be paid to
policies to guarantee that the estimated level of investment will in fact be
reached in each of these sectors. The community development sector needs
much more detailed planning with regard to types of project and personnel
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than has been possible for the first Five-Year Plan, The private investment
sector needs a clear delinention of policies designed to encourage and
direct private investment. These policis should include a clear statement
of monetary policy, tax policy, land policy, and foreign exchange policy;
definitive foreign investment, mining, an petroleum laws; and effective
measures to deal with the squatter problem,
Foreign investment, mining, and petrToleum laws have already been
drafted. If pased by Parliament, they -ay well prove satisfactory.
However, the questions of land policy, squatter policy, monetary policy,
and tax policy designed to direct and encourage private investment, so as to
assure the required level and structure of investment for the achievement
of targets set forth in the plan, clearly need a good deal more researcho
Re.:ommendations from the National Planning Bureau are obviously in order,
although the Bank Indonesia, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Home
Affairs, and the Ministry of Agriculture are also involved in these aspects
of development policy. Perhaps some special interdepartmental committee
should be set up to work on these problems.
With regard to squatters, for example, the Bureau might consider such
possibilities as persuading the planters to turn over to squatters the right
to the land if in turn the squatters wou:ld undertake to grow plantation
products instead of foodstuffs0 Another possibility would be to remove the
squatters from the center of the plantation to the periphery and turn them
into smallholders. Either approach would assure the plantations of adequate
supplies of raw materials to maintain the processing plants at full capacity,
while providing the squatter-turned-smallholder a market and technical
assistance. However, these are all subjects on which further study is
clearly needed.
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In this connection, the Bureau may find it useful to look at the
Philippines Five-Year Developmnt Prograin which sets forth clearly
policies recommended for the private investment sector. Another strong
point of the Philippines plan which might be considered by the Bureau
is the statement of "action expected from other government agencies" in
carrying out the plan.
Regional Structure
Closely related to the sectoral strutcture is the regional structure
of the plan, which has political as well as economic importance. It is
obvious that there is at present a disequilibrium among the major regions
of Indonesia, and both political stability and balanced growth would seem to
require the achievement of some regional equilibrium. How is this to be
done? The present Five-Year Plan includes no clear statement of policy
with regard to location of industry0 Industrial location should be
thoroughly studied, both for the private and for the public sector
Several related topics suggest themselves for research. One very
important question is, "What are the limits to increased output in Javanese
agriculture, with the rural population at its present level?" Estimates of
potential increases in output through careful use of fertilizer, development
of new seed strains especially suited for Javanese conditions, and improved
tillage, range from 35 pe. cent to 75 per cent. It is of the utmost impor-
tance to know how long a breathing spell exists before the Javanese rural
population must be reduced (through shifting to industrial occupations or
to the Outer Islands) in order to avoid a decline in p capita income in
Javanese agriculture0 It should be ovious that high average incomes for
Indonesia as a whole cannot be obtained so long as nearly half the total
population is in Javanese peasant agriculture, and per capita incomes in that
sector remain as low as they now are. Moreover, such regionally unbalanced
growth could easily result in the political disintegration of the country.
Thus the research should not be limited to determining potential increases
in output with the present size of holdings, but also should be directed
towards estimating potential increases in output per capita if the average
size of holdings is increased, Javanese rxal population reduced, and more
extensive and more mechanized agricultural techniques introduced.
The development of import-replacing Industries on Java is one of the
most hopeful avenues for development. However, before embarking on large
scale investment in such industries, it would be desirable to have estimates
of capital-job ratios in various import-replacing industries.
The same is true of the new export industries that might be developed.
It would be helpful for future planning to have some idea of the relative
capital-job ratios in the petroleum industry, in the production of aluminum,
in tin smelting and the like.
One result of such research should be an answer to the basic question,
"Should self-sufficiency in foodstuffs be abandoned as a goal, in order to
obtain higher levels of per p income?" It is my hunch that in the
Indonesian case, a careful study would su. ,est that self-sufficiency in
foodstuffs is incompatible with truly high levels of per capita income,
and that Indonesia's future lies in the direction of increasing indus-
trialization. But the basic research on which such a conclusion could be
firmly based has yet to be undertaken0
An important by-product of this research would be a projected pattern of
foreign trede and of inter-regional trade. The absence of any such projec-
tion is perhaps the major deficiency of the present plan, in the light of
Indonesia's contimainig balance of payments problems. Later versions of the
plan might include a pattern for approach to balance of payments equilibrium both
internationally and inter-regionally. Such a pattern would require more
detailed projections wiith respect to the growth of new industries, both on
the inport-replacing and on the exporting ide.
It is ty current view that cumultive economic growth in any country
begins when labor becomes scarce in the agricultural sector, so that it p
individual farmers to shift to more extenive and more mechanized techniques,
What is the expected impact of the plan 6n the level and structure of
employment? Can labor be made scarce in lava, at some early phase in
Indonesia' s developmeit?
In general, more attention needs to be paid to the phasing of develop-
ment over the twenty year period, Projection with regard to population
growth, ICOR, and investment alone are not enough. Careful consideration
should be given to the kinds of investment that should be made in each five
year phase. A kind of historical model should be developed, indicating
targets with respect to output and employment in peasant agriculture,
plantation agriculture, smallholders' activities, light industries, heavy
industries, and the like. The structure of the economy should be plotted
throughout the whole twenty year prograr, This changing structure should
then be translated into detailed plans for investment and for particular
projects in each of these sectors.
It might even be desirable to construct some kind of input-output table,
even if only "x's" can be put in each of the columns. That is, even without
detailed statistics as to the precise proportions of inputs derived from
other industries, and of allocation of otputs among other industries, it
would be very helpful to know what industries are related to industry "A",
on the input side and on the output side Given such information, one could
then get a picture of the balanced gro<wt of the econcmy, and of the implications
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of structural change.
Other needed research relates to the relationship of the growth of
the labor force to the growth of populatiMn as a whole, under varying
assumptions with regard to the structure of production. Indeed, the whole
question of employment has been rather badly neglected in the present plan.
A related question is, "What can be done to absorb seasonal unemployment?"
How much seasonal unemployment is there? Could it be absorbed into road
construction,. rirperccons rn. harb improvement, land clearing,
irrigation projecs and t 1-lke? Can Iantaticns make use of seasonally
unemployed angs? Could snallholdings be exanded by using seasonal
unemployment? And so forth,
Another gap in the plan is the lack of a detailed program for im-
proving public and private administration. Here too, further research can
be done; in this case, the research night be done within the universities
themselves, to determine what sort of training at the secondary school and
university levels is best designed to produce quickly the cadre of adminis-
trators, for private enterprise and for government, that is needed to carry
out a development plan,,
The Ffinancial Plan
A study of Financing Development With An Application to Indonesia has
been prepared by Dr, Pasuw and myself, This study analyses the financial
problems in considerable detail (some 500 -mimeographed pages), Accordingly,
we deal here only with some major aspects of the financial problem.
Obviously, a najor question with respect to any economic development
plan is the rethod of financing it, It ould be highly desirable for sub-
sequent revisions of the plan to include detiled analysis of the firnancial
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situation in Indonesia, and a detailed plan for financing the investment
program, As a basis for such a financial plan, further research is clearly
necessary.
It is the view of Dr. Paeuw and myself that the main tax potential exists
among the wealthiier peasants and small land owners; although expansion of
the industrial sector should bring significant increases in revenues without
raising tax rates above existing levels0 However, the amount of empirical
study that was possible for Dr, Paauw an d mnyself was very limited. Much
more thorough scrutiny is needed of the tax potential in the heavy industry
sector, the small industry sector, the plantation sector, the smallholders
sector, the peasant-agriculture sector, the trading sector, and the like.
Here again, collaboration with other government agencies, in particular the
Ministry of Financing, the Bank Indonesia, the Ministries of Trade and
Industry, and the Ministry of Agriculture, is probably called for. However,
the financial plan should be presented in the plan document, no matter how
much of the research is actually done by other government departments. In
this respect, too, the Bureau might find it of interest to study the
Philippines Plan.
Further research is also needed with respect to savings potential. As
a beginning it would be useful to determine more precisely what is the
present level of net savings, and to find out whence the available savings
come. This analysis might be conducted in terms of the same sectors as are
suggested above for the study of tax capacity.
The relationship between the budget and foreign trade policy needs to
be spelled out in greater detail. The size of the budget surplus that will
be needed to finance development without inflation will depends a good deal
on what assumptions can be made with respect to the balance of payments. The
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same is true, of course, with respect to extension of new credits to private
enterpriseo
There was some diifrence of opinion in the Seminar with regard to the
degree of refinemsnt ncsary in the andris underlyin-g the fiscal plan,
My own view is that estimates of" the mergtnl propensitis to save to iroort,
and to pay taxes are not necessary in thi Indonesian case-which is a good
thing, since in thcs total absence of national incom;Te series, it is hard to
see how such esimrts could be rode. A ?.a policy decision, it can be deter-
mined that any increa.se in government spending should be recaptured in taxes.
Net extension of private domestic credit 'hould be limited, as a policy
measure, -o net i asee in private domestic savings not otherwise invested.
Equilibrium in the balance of payments should be a third policy objective.
Under these corditions the multiplier is ore; the national money income will
rise by the increase in puiblic -ad pri 4at i-nvestment plus any increase in
exports. These inoree combined might un 3 per cent to 5 per cent of
national incore ove the first ten yearso the plan, and would then f all.
Thus to prevent inflation the basic budg surpluas must be just enough to
counteract any differcne between such a -Increase in money incomne and the
increase in flow of cons-umers goods resui ing from the investment (which is
unlikely to exceed 3 per cent, to 5 per en of national income), In terms
of rough orders of magnitude, it should b pcssible to make such calculations
with the data availabl in Indonesia. -A m odest budget surplus would probably
do the trick 'In any case, :t can be determinedexperimentally, and some
margin of error is perissible. A price rise of less than 6 per cent per
year, or z price drop of lets than 3 per cent, is unlikely to retard economic
growth to any ig cnt extento
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Forein Aid
The present version of the plan regards foreign aid as a residual.
The Rp. 200 million per year estimated is of c.ourse a very small figure; at
present average rates of exchange (say Rpe 20 to $l400) this amounts to
$10 million per year, about what has been provided recently in technical
assistance alone. The underlying assumption is that if in fact foreign aid
proves to be above this figure the investment program can be telescoped.
While this approach may be satisfactory for the first five year tranche
of the plan, it wold be uasef ul if subsequent revision of the plan incor-
porated more detailed plans with respect to foreign aid0 (Here again, the
Philippines Development Program may serve as a model.) Of course, the actual
amount of foreign aid received in any year depends on actions of governments
other than the Indonesian one; but it should be possible to approximate the
right order of magnitude of foreign aid for the first half of any five year
period, in terms of amounts of foreign aid already in the pipe line.
In the case of technical assistance, more precision still should be
possible. Requirements for technical assistance should be stated for the
five-year period covered by each plan. In this fashion technical assistance
requests become an integral part of the plan, and there will be more assurance
that these requests reflect the actual requirements of the plano
Political Goals
It would also be desirable if the next version of the plan endeavored
to translate into detailed projects the commonly accepted political goals
with regard to development: viz., organization of the econosy on "coopera-=
tive lines", and "converting the colonial economy into a national economy".
I have some reservations with respect to the first goal 0  It is my
feeling that "community-minded" Indonesians believe that the organization
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of cooperatives, along the lines suggested in the "middle-way" proposals
in Europe during the 1930' s, is more consonant with the Indonesian community
spirit (gotong on musjawarat desa, etc.) than organization in the form
of corporations.
I have doubts as to whether this relationship really holds in fact.
What institutions and policy measures conform best to the Indonesian con-
ception of a cooperative society remains to be seen. It may not be a society
organized into cooperatVes; a cooperative: may be as ruthlessly exploitative
as any other form of enterprise-witness the batik cooperative which
endeavors to use its powers to exploit consumers on the one hand and wage
earners on the other0  Indeed, the modern corporation, with its widely
diffused ownership, its old-age, sickness and life insurance, its guaranteed
annual wages, its five-year contracts with "escalator" clauses, its profit-
sharing arrangements and trade union participation in management, may come
closer to the true cooperative ideal than some forms of cooperative
organization.
There is, of course, one way in which a corporation can never conform
exactly to the Indonesian conception of communal life; decision-making can
never be entirely dependent on achieving the appearance of unanimity.
Decisions must be based--at least occasionally-on majority opinion. If,
for example, trade unions are accorded minor representation in the manage-
ment, it is out of the question to postpone or avoid all decisions on which
differences of opinion between the trade union and representatives and the
ownership representatives still prevail.
An interesting aspect of the proposed Five-Year Plan is that it con-
tains an implicit compromise solution to the conflict between the economics-
minded and community-minded groups. In effect the plan proposes a special
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kind of mixed econony for Indonesia: it includes projects for a large
scale government enterprise sector, for a large scale private enterpriss
sector, and for a community development sector. The implication is that in
the first two sectors techniques and organizetions will be selected so as
to maximize prcductivity, even if these techniques and forms of organization
do not conform with the traditional ideals of gotong-royong, ramah-tamah
and kerdaj-sama. Thus in these two sectors the plan makes a concession to
the economi.cs-ind3d group which wishes tov maximize the rate of increase in
national incomeO The other sector, however, can be organised in conformity
with the ideals of a "cooperative society", thus making a concession to
the comrunity-minded group which stresses the traditional forms and values
of Indonesian village society.
Much remains to be done to translate the cooperative ideal into
specific policies and institutions. However, the development plan as pro-
posed by the Planning Bureau leaves the door open to pursuit of the coopera-
tive ideal in the peasant agriculture and cottage industry sector, in which
the bulk of the population is now employed, while permitting large-scale
industry to pursue efficiency for its own sake. As time goes by and under-
standing of modern corporative organization grows among Indonesians, it may
be concluded that high productivity and the comunity spirit can be made
consistent with each other in the plantation and industry sector as well.
However, our main point is that this question deserves more careful
study than it has yet receivedc Exactly which economic activities
can be effectively carried out within a ecoperrtive structure, and what is
the actual impact on v1llage society likely to be?
With regard to conversion of the colonial econory into a national one,
it seems to us desirable for Indonesian:3 t;o get the picture of a growing
economy, in which Idone sians a;re responsible for an increasing share of
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the increases in investment. It is in this way that the former "colonial
economies" of the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand (and now
India?) have been converted to national economies. This approach is clearly
very different from one of displacing existing foreign enterprises and
replacing them with lomestic ones, which may result in temporary contraction
of total output and income. Thus far the efforts of the various governments
to "nationalize" the economy have been lirited to reserving certain imports
for Indonesian importers. The one clear-cut result of these policies has
been to drive som Chinese entrepreneurs from trading to productive
enterprises--which develops the econory but does not make it any more
"national",
However, this question is clearly one for Indonesians to answer; once
again our main recommendation is simply that the whole question be studied
objectively, and that an effort be made to set forth a precise series of
projects, legislation, and regulations which can have the effect of in-
creasing the role of Indonesians in the economic life of their own country,
without excessive sacrifices in terms of productivity.
